Marquette Law Review
Volume 36
Issue 2 Fall 1952

Article 14

Landlord and Tenant - Right of One to
Contribution or Indemnity Against the Other
Where a Covenant to Maintain and Repair the
Premises is Breached
James B. Rose

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
James B. Rose, Landlord and Tenant - Right of One to Contribution or Indemnity Against the Other Where a Covenant to Maintain and
Repair the Premises is Breached, 36 Marq. L. Rev. 208 (1952).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol36/iss2/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

shown, and the facts indicate that it may as readily be ascribed to a nonactionable as well as an actionable cause, holding that it is not within
the proper province of a jury to guess where the truth lies and make
that the foundation for a verdict.'7
In view of the fact that both the language and the reasoning of the
Wisconsin cases in applying or refusing to apply the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine bear a striking resemblance to that of the Slack case,' 8 there is
good reason to believe that tie Wisconsin court may follow the conservative view if called upon in the future to decide an "exploding bottle" case.
However, what the final accepted shape of the rule will be can
hardly be predicted. The reasoning 'of the Slack case, requiring "control" to mean that both inspection and user must have been at the time
of the 'injury in the exclusive control of the party charged, and stating
that the mere fact that a bottle exploded does not necessarily compel an
inference of negligence, would seem to be the more logical law.
Whther its application effects the most desirable results is obviously
open to question in' view of the modern tendency to extend the rule in
order to afford relief to an injured plaintiff rather than to the defendant,
who is usually better able to sustain the loss. But the question of who
should bear the loss would seem to be one of policy to be decided by
tthe legislature -rather than by the courts. 9
0.

MICHAEL BONAHOOM

Landlord and Tenant-Right of One to Contribution or Indemnity Against the Other Where a Covenant to Maintain and Repair the Premises is Breached-Action commenced by Hardware
Mutual Casualty Co. (subrogee of insured lessor) against the defendant lessee, to recover contribution of 50% of the amount which plaintiff paid lone Vorek and her husband' in settlement of claims for injuries caused by the negligently defective' condition of the entranceways
and stairs and which were received by her while in defendant's drug
store to purchase merchandise. Defendant appealed from an order
overruling demurrer to complaint. Held: Affirmed. The complaint has
stated sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for contribution.
Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Rasmussen Drug Co., 261 Wis. 1,
51 N.W. 2d 551 (1952).
Hyer v. City of Janesville, 101 Wis. 371, 77 N.W. 729 (1898).
Klein v. Beeten, 169 Wis. 285, 172 N.W. 736 (1919); Jensen v. Jensen, 228
Wis. 77, 279 N.W. 628 (1938) ; Koehler v. Theinsville State Bank, 245 Wis.
281, 14 N.W. 2d 15 (1944); Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Matson, 256 Wis.
304 41 N.W. 2d 268 (1950).
9 Ins. L. J., supra note 11.
'WIs. STATS, (1949), sec. 101.01, 101.06.
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Although no covenant to repair or maintain the premises actually
existed in this case, the problem raised by such a covenant is suggested
in the concurring opinion to the case by Justice Currie. Stated simply,
the problem is whether A (a lessor or lessee) can recover contribution 2
or indemnity 3 from B (the other party to the covenant) for losses
sustained through satisfaction of liability to third persons created by
A's breach of a covenant whereby A assumed the sole responsibility of
maintaining the premises and of curing any defects therein. Justice
Currie concluded that A would not be entitled to recover from B for
such losses.4
At the common law, there was no right of contribution or indemnity
among joint tortfeasors. 5 In the realm of intentional wrongs, the rule
is still in force. 6 However, the rule in Wiisconsin and other jurisdictions today is that contribution between joint tortfeasors may be enforced when a common liability exists between them and the wrong
creating the joint liability is a mere act of negligence involving no moral
turpitude.7 The right exists in favor of an alleged joint tortfeasor who
has paid more than his just share of such a loss." The doctrine of indemnity has at all times been enforced in cases where a duty to another
is breached and such other suffers a loss thereby.9
In the case of Johnson v. Prange-GeussenhainerCo.10 a third party
was injured as a result of ice collecting on the sidewalk from water
flowing from a leaky drainpipe on the outside of a building leased by
Prange Realty Co. (co-defendant) to Prange-Geussenhainer Co. (codefendant). The lease contained a reservation by Prange Realty Co.,
lessor, of the right to maintain the outside of the premises and also an
indemnity clause stating that the Prange Realty Co. was to be exempt
from all liabilities created by the condition of the premises and that the
Prange-Geussenhainer Co., lessee, would accordingly hold the Prange
Realty Co. harmless therefor. In an action by the injured party against
2

Payment by one' of several joint tortfeasors to another of his share of a com-

mon liability which the other has satisfied. See B.Acx, LAw DIcTIONARY, 339
(4th ed. 1951).
3 Satisfaction of a security given against loss, damage, or injury. See BLAcK,
LAW DICTIONARY, 910 (4th ed. 1951).

4 "This case comes to us on demurrer to the complaint and I agree with the

majority decision that the complaint states a cause of action for contribution,
and therefore the demurrer was properly overruled by the trial court. However, after the defendant has answered and the trial is held on the merits, it
may develop that the injuries to Mrs. Vorek were caused by defects to the
premises which were the sole responsibility of the lessor, in which case plaintiff would then not be entitled to recover contribution from the defendant
tenant." Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Rasmussen Drug Co., 261 Wis. 1,

51 N.W. 2d 551 (1952).
5 For complete discussion see Note, 140 A.L.R. 1306 (1942).
7 Ellis V. Chicago NWR Co., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).
8 Brown v. Haertel, 210 Wis. 354, 244 N.W. 633 (1933).
9 See Note, 140 A.L.R. 1307 (1942).
10 Johnson v. Prange-Geussenhainer Co., 240 Wis. 363, 2 N.W. 2d 723 (1942).
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both the lessor and the lessee for injuries sustained as a result of falling on the icy sidewalk, judgment was had against both under the Wisconsin Safe Place Statute."' The lessor was then granted a judgment
over against the lessee for indemnity even though the lessor had
breached its covenant to repair the outside of the premises and that
breach was the cause of the injury to the plaintiff. The judgment over
for indemnity was based solely on the indemnity clause contained in
the lease.
The majority rule is that a lessor is not liable to the lessee for injuries resulting from his (lessor's) failure to carry out his agreement
to maintain the premises. 12 However, Wisconsin favors the minority
rule that the lessor is liable to the lessee where he negligently fails to
carry out the agreement to maintain the premises.13 Whre A covenants
with B to the effect that A will maintain the premises and cure any defects therein, and then A breaches such covenant, resulting in injury to
a third party, and B has been obliged to pay to such injured third party
a claim for damages caused by such breach, it has been held that A must
indemnifyB for the loss.'14
The American Law Institute's Restatement of Restitution states the
rule as follows:
"Where a person has become liable with another for harm caused
to a third person because of his negligent failure to make safe a
dangerous condition of land or chattels which was created by
the misconduct of the other or which, as between the two, it was
the other's duty to make safe, he is entitled to restitution from
the other for expenditures properly made in the discharge of
such liability, unless after discovery of the danger he acquiesced
in the continuation of the condition."' 5
This rule applies to situations where a person is subjected to liability
because another has failed in his duty (by contract or by statute) to
6
keep the premises in a safe condition and a third party is harmed.1
"In all that class of cases where one party owes a legal duty to
the public and to third persons to keep a place or an instrumentality reasonably safe, whenever another, by contract, agrees to
perform that duty for him upon sufficient consideration, such
contract by implication of law becomes one of indemnity and
renders the party assuming such duty by contract liable for all
damages that may legally be recovered by third persons against
such party upon whom the law had in the first instance cast such
1 "Supra,note 1.
12 For complete discussion of the cases see Note, 163 A.L.R. 310 (1946).
13Baum v. Bahn Frei Mut. Building & Loan Ass'n., 237 Wis. 117, 295 N.W. 14
(1940) ; Skrzypczak et ux. v. Konieczka, 224 Wis. 455, 272 N.W. 659 (1937);
see Note, 28 A.L.R. 1450 (1924).
4
'1 Trego v. Rubovits, 178 Ill. App. 127 (1913) ; see Note, 157 A.L.R. 623 (1945).
15 RSTTEMENT, RESITUTION, §95 (1937).
16 RsTATEMENT, Ra s=Triox, Explanatory Notes, §95 (1937).
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duty, as a result of the failure to comply with such contract."' 7
Thus, a covenant to maintain premises and cure defects therein, is
by operation of law a covenant to indemnify for any failure or breach
of such duty. Further, it is held that one of the general remedies of the
lessee against the lessor for breach of the covenant to repair is an action
at law to recover the damages, including injuries to third persons, suffered through such breach.'
The Wisconsin court construed the indemnity clause of the lease to
the extent of controlling the liabilities of the parties and did not consider
the equities involved, viz., that the breach of the covenant to repair
became by operation of law a covenant to indemnify which therefore
rendered the indemnity clause of the lease inoperable. 19 Should the
problem again arise in Wisconsin, or other jurisdictions holding similarly thereto, consideration should be given to the equitable effect of a
breach of a covenant to repair which by operation of law becomes a
covenant to indemnify.
Thus, it may be concluded that the convenantor who agrees to maintain the premises and cure any defects therein cannot recover contribution (which is based on equity and justice) or indemnity (which is
based on contract) where he breaches the covenant. The reasons why
the covenantor should be thus precluded from recovery are that such
a covenant is by operation of law an indemnity provision and it is not
equitable or just to allow him to recover contribution or indemnity for
payment for injuries caused by a defective condition which he promised
to alleviate. Further, where contribution or indemnity is granted the
covenantor, the covenantee should be allowed a counterclaim or setoff
by reason of the cause of action he has acquired by the covenantor's
breach of the covenant to maintain the premises and cure any defects
therein.
JAMES B. ROSE

Wills-Direction to Employ Certain Attorney for Probate-In
his will testator designated appellant as attorney for his estate but testator's sister and next to kin claimed to be entitled to name an attorney of
her own choosing. The corporate administrator was willing to retain
either attorney and petitioned the county court for instructions. From a
ruling that the next of kin was entitled to name the attorney, the lawyer
named by the testator appealed. Held: Reversed. Since the administrator was willing to carry out the expressed desire of the testator, his
Trego v. Rubovits, 178 Ill. App. 127 (1913).
Supra, note 13.
19 Supra, note 10.
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